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ABSTRACT: The article discusses the concept of vicarious liability in the area of com-
petition law. It argues that this concept is to some extent embedded in the concept 
of the undertaking under competition law with the consequence that parent com-
panies – under certain conditions – can be held liable for competition law infringe-
ments committed by subsidiaries. The liability can be termed “vicarious” because it 
is imposed regardless of whether the parent company was involved in or ought to 
have had any knowledge of the competition law infringements committed by the 
subsidiary. Whereas such liability has until recently only been imposed for admin-
istrative fines, the Skanska decision changes this. Following this decision it must be 
assumed that parent companies can also be held vicariously liable for civil liability 
incurred by a subsidiary. It is pointed out that it is a separate question whether the 
Akzo-presumption rule, established with regard to the imposition of fines for compe-
tition law infringements, can also be applied in a pure civil liability case concerning 
parental liability. Next, the article discusses whether the results reached in the area of 
competition law can be transferred to other areas of the law. In this regard, the article 
analyses recent case law with regard to parental liability for workers’ injuries and envi-
ronmental damage and compares these areas of the law to competition law. Finally, 
the article discusses whether the concept of the undertaking can be extended to apply 
also in situations where companies are not tied by ownership but by contract. In this 
regard the article focuses on the (possibly) emerging concept of supply chain liability.
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1. Introduction
In competition law, it has been established since long that a parent com-
pany and a subsidiary may be regarded under certain conditions as a “single 
economic unit” – an “undertaking” – with the consequence that the par-
ent company can be held liable if the subsidiary has incurred administrative 
liability (through imposition of fines) for competition law infringements. 
Although this parental liability has been much criticised, it must be assumed 
that with the Skanska decision, the liability of the parent company for the 
acts and omissions of the subsidiary (“vicarious liability”) has been widened. 
The question of parental liability for competition law infringements is part of 
a wider question of the possible liability of companies for acts and omissions 
of other companies with which they are somehow linked. This article firstly 
describes the development of the concept of the undertaking in the area of 
competition law and examines the implications of the Skanska decision for 
groups of companies with regard to competition law infringements (section 
2). Secondly, it asks whether a similar pattern of development can be found 
in other areas of the law and whether the solutions adopted in competition 
law can be transferred to these other areas (section 3) and thirdly, whether 
the concept of an undertaking could be applicable not only to companies 
linked by ownership but also to companies linked by contract (section 4).
2. Liability for competition law infringements in groups of companies 
2.1. Criminal law liability 
2.1.1. Phase 1: The concept of the undertaking as a shield 
The question of parental liability for competition law infringements hinges on 
the concept of “undertaking” as developed and explained in CJEU case law. 
As it has been pointed out in legal literature,1 originally the concept of 
“undertaking” was developed as a tool for companies connected in a group 
1 Bernardo Cortese, “Piercing the corporate veil in EU Competition Law: The parent subsidi-
ary relationship and antitrust liability”, in EU Competition Law – Between Public and Private 
Enforcement, ed. Bernardo Cortese (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2014), 73-74.
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to avoid being subject to the EC competition law rules. Thus, the purpose 
was to exclude “intra-group” agreements from article 85 EEC. This was 
expressed in the Beguelin decision from the beginning of the 70s’ where 
article 85 was found inapplicable when a subsidiary “although having a 
separate legal personality, enjoys no economic independence”.2 In this 
case, the concept of economic unit could be said to be used as a “shield”3 
and this application of the concept of undertaking could be seen as repre-
senting a first phase in its development.4 
2.1.2. Phase 2: Direct liability
Soon afterwards, however, the concept of economic unit was also used as a 
“sword”.5 In a number of cases, the concept was merely used for establish-
ing the jurisdiction of the Commission over parent companies established 
in non-Member States. For instance, this was the case in the Imperial 
Chemical Industries ruling,6 where the court stated that it would not be 
possible to exclude the possibility of imputing the conduct of the subsidi-
ary to the parent company when “the subsidiary, although having separate 
legal personality, does not decide independently upon its own conduct on 
the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given 
by the parent company”.7 Based on this observation, the court found that 
the parent company and the subsidiary rightly were to be regarded as one 
economic unit and consequently, the Commission also had jurisdiction 
over the foreign parent company.8 With regard to the liability assessment 
however, the concept of the economic unit was not relevant, since there 
was proof that the parent company had directly ordered the subsidiary to 
2 Judgment of 25 November 1971, Beguelin Import v. S.A.G.L. Import Export, C- 22/71, 
EU:C:1971:113, paragraph 8. 
3 Cortese, “Piercing”, 74.
4 The case was followed up by a series of cases applying the same line of reasoning. For an overview, 
see Cortese, “Piercing”, 75-76.
5 For an overview of cases taking this approach, see Cortese, “Piercing”, 76-78.
6 Judgment of 14 July 1972, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v. Commission of the European 
Communities, C-48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70.
7 Judgment of 14 July 1972, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v. Commission of the European 
Communities, C-48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70, paragraph 133. 
8 Judgment of 14 July 1972, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v. Commission of the European 
Communities, C-48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70, paragraphs 139-142.
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establish illegal cartels.9 In other words, the liability of the parent company 
was direct (as opposed to vicarious). 
In a series of subsequent cases,10 where procedural issues were not at 
stake, the court upheld the view that even in case of wholly owned sub-
sidiaries it was necessary for the Commission to establish that the parent 
company had in fact exercised influence on the subsidiary and that there 
was a connection between this control and the infringements committed 
by the subsidiary.11 In other words, liability in this phase of the develop-
ment was direct, fault-based liability.12 
2.1.3. Phase 3: Vicarious liability
However, a marked shift in the approach occurred with the Akzo Nobel 
decision,13 which concerned a wholly owned subsidiary that had engaged 
in an illegal cartel. In its decision, the court established two things. Firstly, 
regardless of fault, a parent company which exercises a sufficient amount 
of control with its subsidiary can be held liable for the administrative fines 
imposed on its subsidiary on the basis that the two legal entities constitute 
an economic unit.14 It is not a requirement that the parent company has 
been involved in the infringement or that there is a connection between 
the control exercised by the parent and the infringement committed by 
the subsidiary. It is not even a requirement that the parent company knew 
or ought to have known of the infringements committed by the subsidi-
ary. Rather, the knowledge of the subsidiary is automatically imputed to 
the parent company once it is established that the parent company and 
9 Judgment of 14 July 1972, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v. Commission of the European 
Communities, C-48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70, paragraph 138.
10 See, for instance, Judgment of 2 October 2003, Madrid SL v. Commission, C-196/99, 
EU:C:2003:529, Judgment of 28 June 2005, Dansk Rørindustri and others v. Commission, joined 
cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P, C-208/02 P, C-2013/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2005:408.
11 Andriani Kalintiri, “Revisiting parental liability in EU competition law”, European Law Review 
43, no. 2 (2018): 4-5, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87251/1/Kalintiri_%20Revisiting%20parental%20
liability_2018_author.pdf, pointing out that the existence of the economic unit at this time was a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition and that for liability to arise, the parent company should 
be shown to have itself contributed to the infringement. See also Cortese, “Piercing”, 84.
12 Cortese, “Piercing”, 77.
13 Judgment of 10 September 2009, Akzo Nobel NV v. Commission of the European Communities, 
C-97/08P, EU:C:2009:536. On the decision Judgment of 16 November 2000, Stora Kopparbergs 
Bergslags AB v. Commission of the European Communities, C-286/98 P, EU:C:2000:630, as paving 
the way for the Akzo Nobel decision, see Kalintiri, “Revisiting”, 5.
14 Judgment of 10 September 2009, Akzo Nobel NV v. Commission of the European Communities, 
C-97/08P, EU:C:2009:536, paragraphs 58-59.
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the subsidiary form an economic unit. Secondly, when a parent is the sole 
owner of a subsidiary there is a presumption that the parent company 
exercises decisive influence over the conduct of the subsidiary and that the 
parent company and the subsidiary therefore constitute an undertaking 
(the Akzo Nobel presumption rule).15 The presumption can be rebutted if 
the parent company can show that the subsidiary acts independently on 
the market.16 In other words, unless the parent company can show that the 
subsidiary acts independently on the market, the parent and the subsidiary 
are considered to form an undertaking for the purpose of competition law 
rules and the parent company will be held liable for the competition law 
infringements committed by the subsidiary.17 Thus, the presumption rule 
puts the burden of proof regarding lack of control on the parent company. 
In practice, it is extremely difficult for a parent company to rebut the pre-
sumption of control.
The general liability rationale behind the Akzo Nobel-ruling has been 
explained in the following way: 
“Given that parent companies, as shareholders, benefit from their sub-
sidiaries’ antitrust infringements, not holding parent companies liable 
would create a perverse incentive for parent companies to encourage their 
subsidiaries to engage in antitrust infringements, in particular by setting 
excessive financial targets or incentives that create pressure to commit 
infringements”.18 
The Akzo Nobel presumption rule has been criticised for sitting uneasily 
with human rights principles, such as the principle of the presumption of 
innocence, the principle of legal certainty, the principle of the right of the 
accused to a defence19 and the principle that penalties should be applied 
solely to the offender. Regardless of this, the Akzo Nobel presumption has 
been upheld by the court. 
15 Judgment of 10 September 2009, Akzo Nobel NV v. Commission of the European Communities, 
C-97/08P, EU:C:2009:536, paragraphs 60-61.
16 Judgment of 10 September 2009, Akzo Nobel NV v. Commission of the European Communities, 
C-97/08P, EU:C:2009:536,paragraph 61.
17 Judgment of 10 September 2009, Akzo Nobel NV v. Commission of the European Communities, 
C-97/08P, EU:C:2009:536, paragraph 61.
18 Wouter P. J. Wils, “Antitrust compliance programmes and optimal antitrust enforcement”, 
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1, no. 1 (2013): 52-81, 60. 
19 On this see inter alia Marco Bronckers, Anne Vallery, “No longer presumed guilty? The impact 
of fundamental rights on certain dogmas of EU Competition Law”, World Competition 34, no. 4 
(2011): 535-570. See also A. Menarini Diagnostics SRL v. Italy, Application no. 43509/08. 
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Aside from the presumption rule, also the very basic system of imputing 
responsibility to the parent company for the acts and omissions of the sub-
sidiary has been criticised for introducing an unclear system of vicarious 
liability.20 However, in the Elf Aquitaine case, the CJEU stated that the court 
has not established “a system of liability for the acts of others”,21 rather the 
parent company is held liable because it cannot be distinguished from the 
subsidiary. The view that the court has not established a system of liabil-
ity for the acts of others can be contested.22 In reality, liability is imposed 
on an entity with legal personality on the basis that another entity with a 
separate legal personality has infringed competition law rules. Since there 
is no requirement that the parent company was involved or had knowl-
edge or ought to have had knowledge of the infringements committed by 
the subsidiary, the created liability standard can in tort law terms most 
naturally be described as vicarious liability (liability for others). However, 
the Akzo Nobel-ruling makes clear that this kind of liability can only be 
imposed if two companies are so “integrated” that they cannot in reality 
be distinguished from one another.23 
The Akzo Nobel case concerned a wholly owned subsidiary. However, 
also in cases of partial ownership it is possible to reach the conclusion that 
the parent company and the subsidiary should be regarded as one entity. 
The closer the shareholding in the subsidiary is to 100 %, the easier it is to 
arrive at this result, and in cases where ownership is close to 100 %, the 
Akzo Nobel presumption will apply.24 
In contrast, outside the scope of the principle of “nearly 100 % owner-
ship”, the Akzo Nobel presumption rule does not apply.25 In these cases, it 
is necessary for the plaintiff to establish that the parent company did in 
fact exercise control over the subsidiary.26 In this respect, various criteria 
apply. For example, the use of the same name or trademark, creating the 
perception of unity for third parties, can be an argument that the companies 
20 Judgment of 1 October 2013, Elf Aquitaine SA v. European Commission, C-521/09 P, 
EU:C:2011:620, paragraph 85. 
21 Judgment of 1 October 2013, Elf Aquitaine SA v. European Commission, C-521/09 P, 
EU:C:2011:620, paragraph 85, paragraphs 87, 88. 
22 See also Cortese,”Piercing”, 87. 
23 Judgment of 10 September 2009, Akzo Nobel NV v. Commission of the European Communities, 
C-97/08P, EU:C:2009:536, paragraphs 58-59.
24 Kalintiri, “Revisiting”, 8, with references to case law.
25 Kalintiri, “Revisiting”, 9.
26 Kalintiri, “Revisiting”, 9, with reference to case law.
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should be regarded as an economic unit.27 Also overlapping positions on 
boards of directors and in supervisory bodies may be relevant to take into 
account when evaluating whether a parent company and a subsidiary 
should rightly be considered one economic entity.28 Likewise, the direct or 
indirect use of parents’ assets (including managers) by the subsidiary may 
be relevant29, as may instructions to the subsidiary or reporting lines going 
from the subsidiary to the parent.30 Finally, accounting practices, and the 
extent to which sales from a subsidiary to a parent company appear in the 
papers as intra-group, may also be used as criteria.31 
Joint venture liability cases show that even in cases of 50% ownership 
and less, it may be possible to establish a sufficient amount of influence 
on the part of the parent company to reach the conclusion that the parent 
companies and subsidiaries form an economic unit. This was made clear 
in the case Dow,32 concerning joint venture and 50% ownership of each 
parent company, where the court listed a number of criteria relevant to 
the understanding of the concept of an “undertaking” related to joint ven-
tures. In this regard, the court found it relevant that the parent companies 
had management power over the subsidiaries through a joint members 
committee,33 so that the parent companies could carry out supervision of 
the subsidiary34 and its compliance with the policies of the parent compa-
ny.35 In the joint venture case Toshiba, the court even acknowledged that 
27 Judgment of 1 July 2010, Knauf Gips KG v. European Commission, C-407/08P, EU:C:2010:389, 
paragraph 104.
28 Judgment of 16 November 2000, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB v. Commission of the European 
Communities, C-286/98 P, EU:C:2000:630, paragraph 6. 
29 Judgment of 1 July 2010, Knauf Gips KG v. European Commission, C-407/08P, EU:C:2010:389, 
paragraph 67.
30 E. Islentyeva “Like father, like son – The parental liability under the EU Competition Law today”, 
Global Antitrust Review (2011): 99, 111.
31 Judgment of 16 November 2000, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB v. Commission of the European 
Communities, C-286/98 P, EU:C:2000:630, paragraph 9.
32 Judgment of 2 February 2012, Dow Chemical v. European Commission, T-77/08, EU:T:2012:47. 
See also Judgment of 2 February 2012, El Du Pont de Nemours and Others v. European Commission, 
T-76/08, EU:T:2012:46; Judgment of 26 September 2013, El Du Pont de Nemours and Others v. 
European Commission, C-172/12 P, EU:C:2013:601. 
33 Judgment of 2 February 2012, Dow Chemical v. European Commission, T-77/08, EU:T:2012:47, 
paragraph 87.
34 Judgment of 2 February 2012, Dow Chemical v. European Commission, T-77/08, EU:T:2012:47, 
paragraph 101.
35 Judgment of 2 February 2012, Dow Chemical v. European Commission, T-77/08, EU:T:2012:47, 
paragraph 101.
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a share of 35.5 % in combination with other criteria could be sufficient to 
establish influence on the part of the parent company to such an extent 
that liability could be imputed.36 On this basis, one might ask whether it 
would be possible to reach the conclusion that two companies could form 
an undertaking even in the absence of any ownership if they are in other 
ways tightly connected.37 
The criteria listed show that, unlike in the cases mentioned above under 
phase 2, it is no longer a requirement to establish control on the part of 
the parent company with the particular acts that constitute competition 
law infringements by the subsidiary. As under the Akzo Nobel-ruling rule, 
control may be exercised at a more general level. Also, as under the Akzo 
Nobel-ruling, it is not a requirement that the parent company had actual 
knowledge of the competition law infringements in order for it to be held 
liable for the acts of the subsidiary. The reason for this is that the knowledge 
of the subsidiary is automatically imputed to the parent company when the 
two companies are considered one undertaking. Consequently, from a tort 
law perspective, the liability concept, also outside the area of the applica-
bility of the Akzo Nobel presumption rule, seems to be best described as 
vicarious liability as long as liability builds on the concept of an undertak-
ing, tying together the parent company and the subsidiary.38 From a tort 
law perspective, the fact that vicarious liability is embedded in the concept 
of the undertaking makes this concept particularly interesting. Thus, in 
tort law, it is the general rule that a tortfeasor can only be held liable for 
its own acts and only in exceptional circumstances for the acts of others.39
2.2. The Skanska decision 
Prior to the Skanska decision,40 it was uncertain whether the doctrine of 
the economic unit, as developed with regard to administrative liability, 
would also apply to civil liability incurred by the subsidiary. In European 
36 Judgment of 9 September 2015, Toshiba v. European Commission, T-104/13, C-623/15, 
EU:T:2015:610; Kalintiri, “Revisiting”, 9.
37 On this, see further below under 4.
38 On the categorisation of the liability as ‘vicarious’, see above under 2.1.3.
39 See Suzanne Galand-Carval, “Comparative report for damage caused by others”, in Unification 
of Tort Law: Liability for Damage Caused by Others, ed. Jaap Spier (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International, 2003), 306. 
40 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan Kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC 
Industry Oy, Asfaltmix Oy, C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204.
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jurisdictions, cases have been going in different directions,41 and in legal 
literature opinions have differed.42 On the one hand, it could be argued 
that it must be less controversial to apply vicarious liability principles to 
civil liability than to criminal liability. Thus, the imposition of vicarious 
liability in civil law cases – although exceptional as a legal principle – can 
hardly attract human rights concerns. On the other hand, vicarious liabil-
ity for civil liability may give rise to other concerns with regard to EU law 
(see further below). 
The introduction of the damages directive,43 making (entirely) clear 
that private actors may sue for competition law infringements under tort 
law, accelerated the need to clarify the issue. Thus, the directive makes 
use of the concept of “undertaking” in defining the infringer under the 
directive,44 but does not define the concept of undertaking. This further 
emphasised the relevance of the question whether the concept of under-
taking as defined by the CJEU and applied with regard to criminal liability 
can be transferred to the area of civil liability. 
The Skanska decision, which was decided according to the law as it 
stood before the entering into force of the directive, concerned a cartel in 
the asphalt market set up in Finland. The question before the court was 
whether a company that had acquired another company could be held 
liable in a civil law case for competition law infringements committed by 
the acquired company, which had now gone bankrupt (i.e. a case of suc-
cession/continuity).45 The Finnish state argued that this would be contrary 
to Finnish national company law, which adheres to the doctrine of sepa-
rate entities and only recognises deviation from this principle in excep-
tional cases, for instance if a structure of separate entities has deliberately 
41 In the UK, the Provini case [2013] EWHC 961 relies on the principle of the economic unit and 
imposes civil liability on the parent company for competition law infringements of the subsidiary, 
whereas a French decision, Cour de Cassation Chambre Commerciale, 15 Novembre 2011, Societé 
JC Bramford Escavators ltd., Societé JCB Finance ltd., Societé JCB Sales ltd., Societé JCB Services 
contre Societé Central Parts, case no. 10-21.701, rejects the application of the principle with regard 
to civil liability. 
42 Critical Cortese, “Piercing”, 92. 
43 Directive 2014/104/EU of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and 
of the European Union.
44 Article 1(1).
45 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan Kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC 
Industry Oy, Asfaltmix Oy, C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 23.
M&CLR_III_2.indd   115 02/12/2019   16:02:54
116  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iii / no. 2 / october 2019 / 107-129
been used in an attempt to avoid liability.46 The company (Asfaltmix) also 
argued that the doctrine of the economic unit in EU competition law only 
applied to with regard to administrative liability, not civil liability.47 The 
CJEU rejected these arguments and stated that the concept of the under-
taking was applicable not only with regard to administrative liability but 
also with regard to civil liability. The court stated: 
“if the undertakings responsible for damage caused by an infringement 
of the EU competition rules could escape penalties by simply changing 
their identity through restructurings, sales or other legal or organisational 
changes, the objective of suppressing conduct that infringes the competi-
tion rules and preventing its reoccurrence by means of deterrent penal-
ties would be jeopardized (…) It follows that the concept of ‘undertaking’ , 
within the meaning of article 101 TFEU, which constitutes an autonomous 
concept of EU law, cannot have a different scope with regard to the imposi-
tion of fines by the Commission (…) as compared with actions for damages 
for EU competition rules”.48 
Although the case concerns the liability of a company which has 
acquired another company (a succession case), it must be assumed that the 
decision will have implications also for the question of the liability of the 
parent company for the acts and omission of their subsidiaries.49 Thus, the 
main problem with regard to imposing liability in these cases is the same 
as in the Skanska decision: Liability can be seen as running counter to the 
basic company law principle of separate entities. In the Skanska decision, 
it was explicitly pointed out that Finnish rules on civil liability are based 
on the principle that only the legal entity that caused the damage is liable 
and that it is possible to “pierce the corporate veil” only if “the operators 
46 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan Kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC 
Industry Oy, Asfaltmix Oy, C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 15, where it is explained that, with 
regard to piercing the corporate veil, Finnish law is primarily case-based. 
47 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan Kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC Industry 
Oy, Asfaltmix Oy, C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 41.
48 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan Kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC 
Industry Oy, Asfaltmix Oy, C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraphs 46 and 47.
49 In support of this view, see Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan Kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial 
Solutions Oy, NCC Industry Oy, Asfaltmix Oy, C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 15, where the 
CJEU equals sales to other structural changes in speaking about the risk of companies escaping 
penalties through “restructurings, sales or other legal or organizational changes”.
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concerned used the group structure, the relationship between the com-
panies or the shareholder’s control in a reprehensible or artificial man-
ner, resulting in the avoidance of liability”.50 In other words, it was made 
clear that under Finnish law the basic company law principle of separate 
entities would – as a general rule – be regarded as barring the imposition 
of liability in a case like this. However, the CJEU found that these basic 
company law principles must yield to the understanding of the concept of 
“undertaking” under article 10151. Consequently, it must be assumed that 
the concept of the undertaking as developed by the court will apply also to 
parent companies in cases concerning their civil liability for competition 
law infringements by a subsidiary. 
A separate question is whether the Akzo Nobel presumption rule will 
also apply in civil liability cases concerning wholly owned subsidiaries. 
Thus, in legal theory it has been argued that an application of the pre-
sumption rule in cases concerning civil liability would run counter to the 
procedural autonomy principle under EU law, according to which matters 
of procedure are left to national law, unless EU law explicitly imposes a 
uniform approach.52 A presumption rule shifts the burden of proof from 
the plaintiff to the defendant. It could be argued that this is indeed a pro-
cedural rule. However, it could also be argued that the presumption rule 
should rather be seen as forming part of liability standard on vicarious 
liability, which has nothing to do with procedural law issues. The Skanska 
decision does not rule on the question of the applicability of the Akzo 
Nobel presumption rule in civil liability cases explicitly as it concerns a 
case of succession and economic continuity rather than parental liability. 
However, in the Skanska decision, the court emphasised that “actions for 
damages for infringement of EU competition rules are an integral part of 
the system for enforcement of those rules”53 and for that reason the con-
cept of the undertaking should be understood in the same way with regard 
50 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan Kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC Industry 
Oy, Asfaltmix Oy, C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 15, where the Finnish rules on civil liability, 
which are primarily based on case law, are explained. 
51 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan Kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC Industry 
Oy, Asfaltmix Oy, C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 36.
52 Cortese, “Piercing”, 93.
53 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan Kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC Industry 
Oy, Asfaltmix Oy, C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 45.
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to administrative and civil liability.54 This would seem to suggest that also 
the Akzo Nobel presumption rule must be regarded as “imported” into the 
area of parental civil law liability for competition law infringements. 
3.  Liability in groups of companies in other areas of the law – lessons 
to be learned from competition law? 
3.1. General introduction to other areas 
The possible liability of parent companies for the acts of their subsidiar-
ies has also increasingly attracted interest in areas of the law other than 
competition law. In particular, this is true with regard to liability for 
workers’ injuries and environmental harm. One of the reasons for this 
increased interest is a pressure stemming from internationally adopted 
soft law norms. As examples the UN Global Compact55, the UN Guiding 
Principles56, and the OECD principles for multinational enterprises could 
be mentioned.57 
The following focuses on recent developments in primarily European 
law concerning parental liability for work injuries and environmental 
harm caused by subsidiaries. The focus is primarily on cases with trans-
national elements (so-called foreign direct liability cases),58 although cer-
tain national cases will also be included. In contrast to the competition 
law area, cases have not primarily concerned administrative liability. A 
number of civil law suits have been brought. Nevertheless, following the 
Skanska decision, the law seems less developed with regard to parental 
liability in these areas of the law than in the area of competition law. This 
is further explained in the following. 
54 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan Kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC 
Industry Oy, Asfaltmix Oy, C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 47.
55 UN Global Compact, available at www.unglobalcompact.org.
56 John Ruggie, “Guiding principles on business and human rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework”. https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publica-
tions/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf.
57 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, available at www.oecd.org.
58 Liesbeth Enneking, Foreign Direct Liability and Beyond. Exploring the Role of Tort Law in 
Promoting International Corporate Social Responsibility and Accountability (The Hague: Eleven 
International Publishing, 2012).
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3.2. Developments in case law 
3.2.1. Direct liability
Cases concerning the possible parental liability for the acts and omissions 
of subsidiaries are familiar across different legal systems, and company law 
in most European legal systems only allow for “piercing of the corporate 
veil” under certain specific circumstances such as abuse of legal entities in 
serious cases.59 However, cases concerning parental liability for workers’ 
injuries and/or environmental damage need not necessarily be based on 
company law principles on veil piercing but can be based on basic tort law 
principles.60 Since the basic tort law liability principle is fault, this means 
that it is necessary to demonstrate some degree of control on the part of 
the parent company with the subsidiary. 
In many European legal systems, 100 % ownership or nearly 100 % own-
ership combined with proof of some degree of control by direction or coor-
dination of the activities of the subsidiary are requirements for showing 
the necessary degree of control.61 The emphasis on the amount of owner-
ship corresponds with the criteria under competition law. Also other indi-
cators are relevant such as consolidated accounts, identity between boards 
of parent companies and subsidiaries and codes of conduct regarding CSR 
matters applying to the entire group of companies.62 As in the area of com-
petition law, cases have concerned both situations of active involvement in 
the shape of “orders” on the part of the parent company to commit torts 
and situations where the parent company has failed to prevent infliction 
of harm by the subsidiary of which it had knowledge or ought to have had 
knowledge.63
That liability can also be incurred for omissions was illustrated in the 
much discussed Chandler case,64 where a parent company was held liable 
for work injuries sustained by employees, exposed to asbestos, in a fully 
59 Cees van Dam, “Tort law and human rights: Brothers in arms - On the role of tort law in the area 
of business and human rights”, Journal of European Tort Law 2, no. 3 (2011): 221, 247.
60 Peter Rott and Vibe Ulfbeck, “Supply chain liability of multinational corporations?”, European 
Review of Private Law 23, no. 3 (2015): 415, 432. 
61 Van Dam, “Brothers in arms”: 248, pointing out also that details vary in the different European 
systems.
62 Van Dam, ”Brothers in arms”: 249
63 Van Dam, “Brothers in arms”: 250.
64 Chandler v. Cape, [2012] EWCA Civ. 525.
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owned subsidiary.65 The case concerned the omission of the parent com-
pany to prevent the injuries and the court found that the parent company 
had assumed liability towards the workers of the subsidiary, in particu-
lar because of the parent company’s superior knowledge in the area, its 
knowledge of the problems at the workplace and knowledge that the work-
ers employed by the subsidiary would have expectations to be protected 
against such risks by the parent company. It is worth noticing, however, 
that control in itself is not enough to establish liability under the Chandler 
ruling. It is also a requirement that the parent company knew or ought to 
have known that the subsidiary was violating the norms in question.66 
Moreover, although parental liability cases have typically concerned 
parent companies with majority shares in the subsidiaries, no presump-
tion rule similar to the Akzo Nobel presumption rule in the area of compe-
tition law has been suggested.67 This means that with regard to the actual 
exercise of control in cases concerning workers’ injuries and environmen-
tal damage, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.68 It also follows that it 
is necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the parent company had knowl-
edge or ought to have had knowledge of the infringements caused by the 
subsidiary. 
In other words, so far, parental liability in areas of the law other than 
competition law can probably best be described as being in phase 2, with 
the reservation that liability cases concern not only administrative liabil-
ity, but also civil liability. 
65 For a discussion of the case and related ones, see for instance Vibe Ulfbeck and Andreas 
Ehlers, “Direct and vicarious liability in supply chains”, in Law and Responsible Supply Chain 
Management, eds. Vibe Ulfbeck, Alexandra Andhov, Katerina Mitkidis (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2019), 91. 
66 Chandler v. Cape, [2012] EWCA Civ. 525, paragraph 80.
67 Although the competition law concept of the undertaking is often mentioned in literature con-
cerning parental liability in other areas of the law, the application of a presumption rule parallel 
to the Akzo Nobel presumption rule has not been considered as an independent question, see for 
instance Van Dam, “Brothers in arms”, 249, and Rott and Ulfbeck, “Supply chain liability”, 429. 
68 It is worth noticing that in the Chandler decision, with regard to establishing reliance on the part 
of the employees of the subsidiary, the court stated that in assessing this element “it is not neces-
sary to show that the parent is in the practice of intervening in the health and safety policies of the 
subsidiary. The court will look at the relationship between the companies more widely”, Chandler 
v. Cape, [2012] EWCA Civ. 525, paragraph 80. Thus, although the concrete case concerned health 
matters, liability could be triggered by the general control exercised by the parent company over 
the subsidiary. The decision hereby could be seen as containing some – not clearly expressed – 
vicarious liability elements. 
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3.2.2. Phase 3: Vicarious liability?
So far, there have been only few signs, if any, that the concept of vicari-
ous liability could be used to establish parental liability in areas of the law 
other than competition law.69 As explained, in the areas of competition 
law, the concept was first applied with regard to criminal liability. A recent 
legislative initiative, the French loi de vigilance70, can be mentioned as an 
example of the application of criminal liability to parent companies for 
the causing of work injuries and/or environmental damage by subsidiaries, 
but here liability is direct rather than vicarious. 
However, a very recent decision from the UKSC might be read as a sign 
that the use of the concept of “the undertaking” could be under way in 
other areas of the law as well. Thus, in the Vedante decision71, concerning 
the possible liability of a British parent company for environmental dam-
age caused by a subsidiary based in Zambia, the court used the term “a 
single economic undertaking”, stating that at one extreme,
“the parent company may carry out thoroughgoing vertical reorganisation 
of the groups’ businesses so that they are, in management terms, carried 
out as if they were a single commercial undertaking, with boundaries of 
legal personality and ownership within the group becoming irrelevant, 
until the onset of insolvency, as happened within the Lehman Brothers 
group.”72 
Despite the mentioning of the term “single commercial undertaking”, 
the case concerned direct liability.73 Thus, the concept of the undertaking 
as used in competition law has still not been used for establishing vicarious 
69 For an examination of this possibility, see Vibe Ulfbeck and Andreas Ehlers “Tort law, corporate 
groups and supply chain liability for workers’ injuries: The concept of vicarious liability”, European 
Company Law 13, no. 5 (2016), 167. 
70 The French initiative makes it compulsory for companies to adopt a vigilance plan concerning 
activities of the company and the activities of the subsidiaries or companies it controls, see Loi no. 
2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des societés mères et des entreprises don-
neuses d’ordre, at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000034290
626&categorieLien=id (last accessed September 23, 2019). 
71 Vedanta Resources PLC and another (appellants) v. Lungowe and others (Respondents) [2019] 
UKSC 20.
72 Vedanta Resources PLC and another (appellants) v. Lungowe and others (Respondents) [2019] 
UKSC 20, paragraph 51.
73 The case directly only concerned procedural aspects but indirectly also expressed views on the 
substance matter of parental liability for the acts and omission of subsidiaries. 
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liability in other areas of the law. This raises the question whether there are 
any policy reasons supporting a view that vicarious liability should only 
apply in competition law cases. 
The concern that applying vicarious liability with regard to parent liabil-
ity for subsidiaries’ actions and omissions runs counter to the basic com-
pany law principle of separate units applies not only to cases concerning 
workers’ injuries and environmental damage, but equally in the area of 
competition law. In both areas, there seems to be a stronger case for argu-
ing that vicarious liability for the acts and omissions of the subsidiary 
would be contrary to company law principles with regard to direct liabil-
ity. Thus, it could be argued that the company law doctrine of separate 
entities exhaustively regulates the extent to which one entity can be held 
liable for the acts of another entity.74 Nevertheless, these concerns have 
been overcome in the area of competition law. In support of overcoming 
the concerns also in other areas of the law, it could be pointed out that 
applying vicarious liability only implies imposing parental liability in situ-
ations where the subsidiary has committed a tort. Thus, it would not apply 
to situations concerning other types of debts on the part of the subsidiary, 
such as for instance a loan. Consequently, the company law doctrine of 
separate units would not be undermined by the use of the principle. In 
other words, the doctrine of separate entities in company law could be seen 
as leaving ample space not only for direct parental liability, but also for 
vicarious parental liability for torts committed by the subsidiary. The fact 
that this concept has for long been applied within the area of competition 
law could be seen as reflecting this view.
In contrast, a basic policy argument for parental liability for competi-
tion law infringements has a specific EU law angle which is not found in 
same direct way as in cases concerning workers’ injuries and environmen-
tal liability. Thus, competition law plays a key role in the development of 
the common, inner market. Accordingly, market efficiency arguments 
are used to apply the concept of an undertaking as a “shield” and exclude 
the application of competition law rules on “inner group company agree-
ments” and as a – logical – corollary to support the use of the concept of 
an undertaking as a “sword” to establish parental liability for competition 
law infringements. Outside the area of competition law, the concept of the 
74 This argument could be based on the fact that the rules concerning piercing of the corporate 
veil, just like the tort law rules on vicarious liability, concern “liability for others”. Thus, it could be 
argued that the company law rules should be regarded as “lex specialis” in this respect. 
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undertaking is not called for to have a “shield function” and in general 
market efficiency arguments can only more indirectly support parental 
liability for workers’ injuries and environmental damage. 
However, other central parts of the policy reasons for imposing paren-
tal liability for competition law infringements by subsidiaries seem to be 
valid also with regard to workers’ injuries and environmental harm. For 
example, the argument that the parent company is the entity benefitting 
from the infringements committed by the subsidiary should also bear the 
economic burden generated by the infringements is of a general nature 
and also valid in other areas of the law. In addition, the argument that it 
should not be possible to evade liability by means of organisational struc-
tures seems generally applicable to all cases concerning parental liability. 
In conclusion, the concerns against establishing vicarious liability apply 
equally in and outside the area of competition law. The fact that they have 
been overcome with regard to competition law infringements and that 
the principle within the area of competition law has now been general-
ised, expanding it to cover also civil liability cases, might speak in favour 
of also overcoming the concerns in other areas of the law, where several 
of the policy reasons underpinning parental liability for competition law 
infringements are equally applicable. 
4.  Supply chain liability for competition law infringements –  
the application of the concept of the undertaking to companies 
linked by contract?
As described above, parental liability for competition law infringements 
has been established even in cases where the parent company has only 
been a minority shareholder of the subsidiary, provided it has been pos-
sible to provide proof of a sufficient influence and control taking place in 
other ways. However, one might ask whether it would be possible to estab-
lish a sufficient amount of control even if the companies are not linked by 
ownership at all but only by contract.
Thus, over the past years, the possible liability of the lead firm75 for acts 
and omissions in global value chains has attracted considerable attention 
75 The term “lead firm” refers to the dominating company in the supply chain, often a buyer based 
in the global north, which is in practice dictating the terms of the contracts in the chain. In the 
present analysis, the chain leader in contractual chains corresponds to the parent company in 
owner-based structures. 
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with regard to environmental damage and work injuries.76 Whether supply 
chains are based on ownership or contract is often a matter of organisa-
tional choice on the part of the lead firm. Several chains consist, in practice, 
of a mixture of relations based on ownership and contract, and products 
may be sold between parent companies and subsidiaries or between com-
panies that are solely linked by contract. Consequently, in legal theory con-
cerning workers’ injuries and environmental damage it has been argued 
that the liability standard should be the same whether the supply chain is 
based on ownership or contract.77 Some case law with regard to workers’ 
injuries implicitly supports this view.78 In other words, it should not be pos-
sible to circumvent liability principles by choice of organisational form.79 
Following this line of thought, one might also pose the question whether 
a lead firm could be held liable for competition law infringements in its 
contractual supply chain. As an example, the possible liability of the lead 
firm for abuse of a dominant position by a supplier could be mentioned. 
Such an abuse may have been triggered by pressure put on the supplier by 
the lead firm to deliver goods at low prices (on the relationship between 
the lead firm and the supplier, see further below). The abuse may have as a 
consequence that the supplier’s suppliers suffer losses, raising the question 
whether the lead firm can be held liable for these losses.80 The policy reason 
for such liability would be that the lead company – at least for a period of 
time – gains from this abuse.81 
76 See in general Vibe Ulfbeck, Alexandra Andhov, Katerina Mitkidis eds., Law and Responsible 
Supply Chain Management (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), with references. 
77 Carolijn Terwindt et al., “Supply chain liability: Pushing the boundaries of the common law”, 
Journal of European Tort Law 8, no. 3 (2018): 261, Rott and Ulfbeck, “Supply chain liability” 415, 432. 
78 See Das v. George Washington Limited [2018] ONSC 1053.
79 It was the exact same reasoning that was put forward in Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan 
Kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC Industry Oy, Asfaltmix Oy, C-724/17, 
EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 46, see further above.
80 The CJEU has previously dealt with similar situations with regard to company groups. As an 
example, the merger case Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission (Judgment of 21 
February 1973, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. Commission of 
the European Communities, C-6/72, [1973] ECR 2015 could be mentioned. In this case a New York 
corporation was found to have acquired a dominant position in the EEC through the action (a 
take-over bid) of a European subsidiary. The parent company and the subsidiary were considered 
to be one economic unit with the consequence that the Commission had jurisdiction over the case, 
see paras 15-17. 
81 It may be argued that in the long run, the lead company will not gain but lose if a supplier abuses 
a dominant position since this will make prices go up. A more precise estimation of the effects in 
the chain would require an economic analysis of the mechanisms in the specific chain. 
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With regard to liability for competition law infringements in supply 
chains based on contract, the central question is whether two companies 
tied together by contract can constitute an “undertaking” as this concept 
is understood in competition law. As described above, the central criterion 
in case law seems to be the amount of control exercised by the lead firm 
on the supplier. 
Supply chain structures vary considerably and, consequently, so does 
the amount of control exercised by the lead company on its suppliers. 
However, also in supply chains based on contract, the lead firm will often 
have a large amount of control with the chain. As put by Faull and Nikpay: 
“The whole nature of distribution has been changed by the information 
technology revolution and the adoption of just-in-time (JIT) principles”.82 
Thus, a small supplier may in reality have market access only through a 
particular lead company and the lead company may in reality set the terms 
of the contract and have the right to vary these terms unilaterally during 
the contractual period of time.83 The relationships are often long term and 
the lead firm may monitor the supply chain and its performance.84 One of 
the reasons for the exercise of control over the supply chain is the societal 
demand that lead firms secure sustainability in their supply chains. This 
demand is reflected in legislative requirements to report on CSR policies85 
and to exercise “due diligence” with regard to sustainability efforts in the 
supply chain. “Supply chain management” has become a recognised dis-
cipline and is concerned not only with the flow of goods but increasingly 
also with services, finances, information and marketing.86 Companies use 
tools such as company policies, joint management committees, open book 
accounts, monitoring, certification and internal supply chain dispute 
82 Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, eds., The EC Law of Competition, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 2007), 1183, mentioning also that “the absence of risk relating to individual 
transaction, which was the main criterion used for differentiating an agent from an independ-
ent trader, is no longer the preserve of the commercial agent”. As an example of a case applying 
the classical distinction between agents and independent traders, see Confederación Española de 
Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v. Compañía Española de Petróleos SA., C-217/05. 
83 Vibe Ulfbeck and Ole Hansen, “Interplay between contract and tort in the supply chain”, in 
Responsible Supply Chain Management, eds. Vibe Ulfbeck, Alexandra Andhov, Katerina Mitkidis 
(Abingdon: Routledge 2019), 140. 
84 Ulfbeck and Hansen, “Interplay”, 140, with further references.
85 Directive 2014/95/EU, ‘Non-Financial Information Directive’.
86 John T. Mentzer, et al., “Defining supply chain management”, Journal of Business Logistics 22, 
no. 2 (2001): 4.
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resolution mechanisms to exercise supply chain management.87 Depending 
on the degree of management on the part of the lead firm, a supply chain 
may in many ways be seen as functioning as a whole rather than as a num-
ber of different entities connected by ownership or contract.88 
Thus, although supply chains differ, it would be perfectly possible to 
identify chains in which – although based on contract – the supplier does 
not function independently but simply “carries out the instructions of the 
buyer” as expressed in the Imperial Chemical case described above.89 
Likewise, many of the tools for control mentioned in the Dow case are 
also used in supply chains based on contract, such as joint member com-
mittees with management power over the suppliers,90 the ability to carry 
out supervision of the supplier91 and to police compliance92 with the poli-
cies of the lead company. This all speaks in favour of regarding it as a pos-
sibility that companies tied by contract could indeed be regarded as an 
“undertaking” with regard to competition law infringements with the con-
sequence that the lead company could be held liable for the infringements 
committed by its contractual supplier, even if it had no knowledge of these 
infringements taking place. 
The flipside of the coin would be that agreements between the lead firm 
and the supplier would then need to be regarded as “internal” agreements 
in the supply chain, not subject to article 101 and 102 of the Treaty.93 That 
87 Ulfbeck and Hansen, “Interplay”, 140, with references, Vibe Ulfbeck Alexandra Andhov, 
Katerina Mitikidis, “Introduction”, in Responsible Supply Chain Management, eds. Vibe Ulfbeck 
Alexandra Andhov, Katerina Mitikidis (Abingdon: Routledge 2019), 5-6. On certification in sup-
ply chains, see Carola Glinski and Peter Rott, “The role and liability of certification organisations 
in transnational value chains”, Deakan Law Review 23 (2018): 83. 
88 Ulfbeck, Andhov, Mitikidis, “Introduction”, 5-6, Ole Hansen, Vibe Ulfbeck, Clement Salung 
Petersen, “Private governance and the potential of private law” (forthcoming in The European 
Review of Private Law, 2019).
89 Judgment of 2 February 2012, Dow Chemical v. European Commission, T-77/08, EU:T:2012:47, 
paragraph 133. In supply chain literature, the term “captive supply chains” is sometimes used 
to express this reality, see G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey, T. Sturgeon, “The governance of global value 
chains” , Review of International Political Economy (RIPE) 12, no. 1 (2005): 78-79.
90 Judgment of 2 February 2012, Dow Chemical v. European Commission, T-77/08, EU:T:2012:47, 
paragraph 87.
91 Judgment of 2 February 2012, Dow Chemical v. European Commission, T-77/08, EU:T:2012:47, 
paragraph 101.
92 Judgment of 2 February 2012, Dow Chemical v. European Commission, T-77/08, EU:T:2012:47, 
paragraph 101.
93 On the discussion concerning a related topic, namely the compliance with EU competition law 
of horizontal sustainability agreements by parties in a supply chain, see Giorgio Monti and Jotte 
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this could in fact be the case is supported by the fact that in the view of the 
Commission, even some vertical agreements that imply transfer of know-
how from the contractor to the supplier should be regarded as not infring-
ing article 101(1) of the Treaty.94 Moreover, to the extent that technology or 
equipment transferred from the contractor to the supplier is necessary to 
enable the subcontractor to fulfil its contractual obligations towards the 
contractor, “the subcontractor is not regarded as an independent supplier 
in the market”.95 If the supplier is not regarded as an independent supplier 
in the market for the purpose of art 101(1), it seems reasonable to ask if the 
corollary of this lack of independence from the contractor (the lead firm) 
could be vicarious liability of the lead firm for competition law infringe-
ments committed by the supplier. 
5. Conclusion 
On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that parent companies may 
incur vicarious liability for competition law infringements caused by the 
acts and omissions of their subsidiaries, if the parent company and sub-
sidiary must be regarded as an economic unit. Following the Skanska deci-
sion, it must be presumed that this applies whether the liability incurred 
by the subsidiary is administrative liability or civil liability. Thus, a more 
general principle of vicarious liability on the part of parent companies 
for competition law infringements by the subsidiaries seems to have been 
established. Other areas of the law seem less developed in this regard. Thus, 
with regard to liability for workers, injuries and environmental harm, the 
general rules still seems to be fault-based liability. Vicarious liability has 
not been introduced in case law. One of the reasons for this may be that 
market efficiency arguments are particularly forceful within the area of 
competition law and can be seen as partly underpinning the law with 
regard to parental liability for competition law infringements commit-
ted by subsidiaries. However, several of the other policy reasons which lie 
behind the expansion of parental liability in competition law apply equally 
in other areas of the law. Most obviously, this is true with regard to the 
argument that it should not be possible for a parent company to gain from 
Mulder, “Escaping the clutches of EU Competition Law – Pathways to assess private sustainability 
initiatives”, European Law Review 42, no. 5 (2017). 
94 See Richard Wish and David Bailey, Competition Law, 9th edition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018), 621 with reference to the Commission’s “Vertical guidelines”. 
95 Wish and Bailey, Competition Law, 622.
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infringements of the law committed by a subsidiary without being held 
accountable. This speaks in favour of introducing the concept of vicarious 
liability for parent companies in other areas of the law as well. In addition, 
it could be argued that both in the area of competition law and in other 
areas of the law, the concept of an undertaking could be applicable not 
only with regard to groups of companies but, under certain conditions, 
also when companies are linked by contract, since it should not be possible 
to evade liability simply by choice of organisational form. 
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